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SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS 




This Note highlights the growing concern of Internet defamation and 
the lack of viable legal remedies available to its victims.  Internet 
defamation is internet speech with the purpose to disparage another’s 
reputation.  At common law, a victim of alleged defamation has the right to 
file suit against not only the original speaker of the defamatory statements, 
but the person or entity to give that statement further publication as well.  
In certain cases even the distributor, such as a newspaper stand, can be held 
liable for a defamation claim.  However, liability due to defamatory speech 
on the Internet is quite different.  Due to the anonymity offered by the 
Internet, a victim of Internet defamation, more often than not, is unable to 
file suit against the original speaker.  As a result, the victim attempts to file 
suit against the website that published the defamatory statement the 
original speaker created.  However, the victim often finds that such a 
website is immune from liability under section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996, which provides, “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”  This 
sweeping statute can effectually eliminate all viable defendants for a victim 
of Internet defamation to seek a legal remedy for the harm caused to him or 
her. 
At the time of the Act’s creation, the Internet was in its primal years 
and was nothing like it is today.  The question is then raised, how could the 
drafters of the Act been able to predict the nature and dominance of the 
Internet as it exists twenty years later?  Today, there are websites dedicated 
entirely to providing a forum for unsupported and unchecked gossip.  
                                                          
 *J.D. candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2016; California State University of 
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Specifically, TheDirty.com even goes so far as to screen every submission 
from their third-party users in order to select for publication only those 
most egregious and damaging.  Moreover, the website publishes all 
submissions under the same pseudonym, thus claiming the statements as its 
own and further protecting the anonymity of the original speaker.  Despite 
the exorbitant amount of editorial control exerted by TheDirty.com, a 
federal appellate court recently found the website to be immune to 
defamation claims under section 230. 
The Internet is far more reaching than its print counterpart, and 
defamatory statements are forever archived and accessible via general 
search engines.  With such great exposure and potential for irreparable 
harm, this Note proposes that section 230 should be amended so as to 
properly distinguish a passive website entitled to immunity (the type of 
website the Act’s drafters had confronted and contemplated) and those of a 
more culpable nature, such as TheDirty.com.  Furthermore, Internet 
defamation should revert back to being treated the same as it would at 
common law.  If a website provides a forum for legally actionable 
activities, actively exercises editorial control of users’ content, and protects 
the anonymity of their users, then the website should be held liable for said 
actions as well. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Online shaming—Internet1 speech with the purpose to disparage 
another’s reputation—has become an ever-growing concern in today’s 
society.2  Offline, such slanderous speech is considered defamation and is 
subject to legal ramifications under common law.3  Defamatory statements 
                                                          
1.  For the purpose of this Note, the term “Internet” shall be referred to in the general 
sense of all inter-web activity taking place online.  However, it should be noted that the Internet is 
really the vast infrastructure that connects millions of computers to one another world-wide and 
stems from the invention of the modem dating back to 1958.  This is not to be confused with the 
World Wide Web, which is a system of interlinked hypertext documents accessible to all on the 
Internet.  See Kim Lachance Shandrow, 10 Fascinating Facts About the World Wide Web on Its 
25th Birthday, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 12, 2014), www.entrepreneur.com/article/232149 
[http://perma.cc/RR24-653L]. 
 
2.  Jason C. Miller, Article, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public 
and Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 230 (2008); see Kraig J. Marton et. al., Protecting One’s Reputation—
How to Clear a Name in a World Where Name Calling Is So Easy, 4 PHOENIX L. REV. 53, 66 
(2010). 
 
3.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining defamation and 
outlining the elements supporting a cause of action). 
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made online are technically afforded the same protection.4  However, due 
to federal circuit courts’ interpretation of section 230 (“Section 230”) of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) and the anonymity of 
defamers, victims of Internet defamation are left with limited or non-
existent opportunities to litigate their claims.5  Section 230 states in part 
that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”6  Section 230, as it stands today, effectually 
bestows upon web hosts, or Internet service providers (“ISPs”), a near 
limitless protection against claims arising out of their online users’ actions.7 
Consider the following illustration:  on a popular online shaming site, 
an anonymous person posted that Sarah Jones, a high school English 
teacher and Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader, slept with every member of the 
Bengals football team and contracted an array of STDs.8  One of her 
students soon came across the posting—in no time, the post was brought to 
the attention of the entire student body, faculty members, and parents of the 
high school students.9  Ms. Jones pleaded repeatedly with the owner and 
creator of the website to remove the defamatory post but, her efforts proved 
futile.10  Others soon began adding their own commentary and allegations 
against Ms. Jones, such as her regularly engaging in sexual activities in her 
                                                          
4.  See Marton, supra note 2, at 65 (“Regardless of the medium in which a publisher 
disseminates defamatory information, a plaintiff must plead and prove the traditional elements of 
defamation to prevail.”). 
 
5.  See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study 
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 373, 379 (2010). 
 
6.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 
7.  See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (barring the 
plaintiff’s otherwise legitimate claim because the only available defendant held immunity under 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act). 
 
8.  Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2014); see 
also Kashmir Hill, Bengals Cheerleader Who Sued The Dirty for Ruining Her Reputation Now 




9.  Hill, supra note 8; see Jones, 755 F.3d at 404. 
 
10.  Jones, 755 F.3d at 404. 
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classroom.11  In an interview, Ms. Jones explained the gravity of the 
reputational harm caused to her, recounting: 
 
I don’t teach elementary school, I teach high school.  These kids 
Google me.  They see things.  If it’s on the Internet, it’s real to 
them.  They believe it. 
. . . . 
One day I was this credible teacher that they looked up to and 
listened to . . . . 
The next day I was a slut to them.  I had a student come in and 
say “I cannot come into my classroom and learn because you 
had sex in here and you’re a slut.”12 
 
The foregoing scenario describes the actual facts that led to the recent 
Sixth Circuit decision in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings 
LLC.13  The Jones decision helped solidify the growing consensus among 
circuit courts that ISPs must actually be the creators of the defamatory 
content to be held liable under the CDA.14  In other words, for a website to 
be held liable for defamation, the defamatory statement must have been 
written by the website provider itself and not by one of its users.15  It is 
important to note that the ISP in Jones not only encouraged such 
defamatory statements, but also screened all of its third-party postings, 
selected only the most scandalous submissions for publication, and added 
its own commentary to the chosen submissions.16 
Jones powerfully illustrates why a statute dating back two decades 
can no longer adequately serve the purpose for which it was created, unless 
properly modified to address issues arising out of the prevalent use of 
interactive online media.  The fact that the active editorial role of the ISP in 
                                                          
11.  Id. at 403–04. 
 
12.  Hill, supra note 8. 
 
13.   Jones, 755 F.3d. 398. 
 
14.  Bill Donahue, 6th Circ. Gossip Site Ruling a Relief for Web Hosts, LAW360 (June 17, 
2014, 8:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/548946/6th-circ-gossip-site-ruling-a-relief-for-
web-hosts [http://perma.cc/N2W7-Z5QG] (discussing the Sixth Circuit Jones opinion). 
 
15.  See id. (“[S]o long as the user-generated content is not materially altered, [Section 
230] immunity will still attach . . . .”). 
 
16.  Id. 
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Jones still failed to disqualify the immunity afforded to the ISP under 
Section 230 indicates the unreasonably high standard of proof that a 
plaintiff must overcome in order to establish ISP liability.  This is 
especially troublesome given that equivalent defamatory statements made 
offline, such as in a newspaper, constitute grounds to hold the publisher of 
such content liable.17  Considering the societal role the Internet plays today, 
it is difficult to comprehend why the Internet, which has the potential to 
cause considerably more damage, should be treated more leniently than its 
printed counterparts. 
Is the owner of an illegal brothel house responsible for facilitating and 
profiting from the illegal practices that occur on such property?  Is the 
owner of a bar whose regulars commonly partake in illegal gambling on his 
premises liable?  The answer to both questions is yes—the owners are held 
accountable for providing the forum for others to partake in illegal 
activities, and their encouragement, facilitation, and profit constitute an 
illegality of their own.18  So why do ISPs, who design the forums that are 
entirely dedicated to illegal practices such as defamation, public disclosure 
of private facts, and copyright infringement, face zero liability?19 
This Note will highlight the illogical reasoning behind the policy 
justifications for upholding the twenty-year-old, overly broad ISP 
immunity granted by the CDA.  In 1996, the internet was nothing like it is 
today—the CDA’s applicability must adapt to the times.20  The courts 
contend that limiting the applicability of Section 230 will have a chilling 
                                                          
17.  See Bryant Storm, Comment, The Man Behind the Mask: Defamed Without a Remedy, 
33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 393, 394 (2013) (illustrating the disparate treatment and unequal protection 
amongst claims made on the Internet versus those that still fall under common law through his 
discussion of John Doe cases). 
 
18.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 318 (West 2015) (“[W]hoever, through invitation or device, 
prevails upon any person to visit any room, building, or other places kept for the purpose of 
illegal gambling or prostitution, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be 
confined in the county jail not exceeding six months, or fined not exceeding five hundred dollars 
($500), or be punished by both that fine and imprisonment.”).  
 
19.  See generally Zac Locke, Comment, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to 
Internet Sites That Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151 
(2008). 
 
20.  See Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 
Is Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet 
Service Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 3 (2007) (arguing Section 230’s application 
to the Internet is outdated and unfair as it overlooks the dominant medium the Internet has 
become since the CDA’s enaction).  
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effect on the freedom of expression afforded under the First Amendment 
because ISPs would become overly cautious in order to protect themselves 
from liability.21  Liability for defamatory statements in printed materials 
has not come at the cost of the freedom of speech guarantees, so why 
should Internet defamation be any different?22 
Internet defamation has a far greater potential to harm than 
defamation in printed materials.23  Speech published on the Internet is 
archived instantly, not only making it accessible to the world at that 
moment, but forever memorializing the association with the defamed 
name—the content will continue to pop-up on search engines for decades.24  
Internet-based defamatory speech, therefore, is more far-reaching than 
common law defamation.25  And yet, while common law avails the victim 
the opportunity to seek legal remedies against the defamer, victims are left 
with little to no chance of establishing a prima facie case in defamation.26  
Nevertheless, doing away with Section 230 entirely, or criminalizing 
internet-based torts,27 is not an adequate solution.  This Note proposes a 
means to an end that will simultaneously protect free speech and deter the 
egregious online behaviors that are becoming increasingly prevalent in 
online social media. 
                                                          
21.  Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 273–74 (2005). 
 
22.  See Locke, supra note 19, at 153. 
 
23.  See Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment 
Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking Sites, 8 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 198 (2009) (“With technological advancements also comes the 
opportunity—indeed the greater likelihood, given the expansive system—for more widespread 
distribution of misinformation . . . .”). 
 
24.  See Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility?: Lessons 
from the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 265 (2007) 
(noting print publications are limited in reach to a finite audience, whereas the Internet extends to 
an infinite audience).  
 
25.  See id. at 247.  
 
26.  See Storm, supra note 17, at 394 (illustrating the disparate treatment and unequal 
protection amongst claims made on the Internet versus those that still fall under common law 
through his discussion of John Doe cases). 
 
27.  See generally Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE 
L. REV. 41 (1998) (arguing it is not necessary “to criminalize what is already criminal activity or 
make a special tort for what is already tortious conduct”); Jeweler, supra note 20 (proposing 
Section 230 should be amended to dictate a common law approach). 
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Part II of this Note provides further background information 
regarding: (1) how anonymity on the Internet further exacerbates the 
problem, (2) defamation laws at common law, and (3) the creation of the 
CDA and its intended purpose and policy justifications.  Part III illuminates 
the negative implications of Section 230 by comparing defamation cases 
prior to the enactment of the CDA with cases decided post-CDA 
enactment, with a particular focus on the Jones decision.  Part IV 
introduces the proposed amendment to the CDA that would maintain a high 
level of speech protection while concurrently providing a viable legal 
remedy to the defamed.  Finally, Part V summarizes the pros and cons of 
the current legal standard and the proposed remedy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 Prior to the enactment of the CDA, online speech was regulated in 
the same manner as any other speech.28  Under common law, liability was 
placed not only on the original defamer, but also on any person who 
reprinted an already-published defamatory statement.29  Today, due to the 
anonymity provided by the Internet, victims of defamation are rarely able 
to identify the author.30  As a result, victims of Internet defamation have 
gone after the websites that either published the libelous statement or 
provided the forum for its publication.31  However, courts have struggled to 
define the scope of immunity afforded ISPs under Section 230 of the CDA.  
Section 230 provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”32  Section 230 
essentially grants ISPs a near limitless protection against causes of action 
arising out of statements posted by their online users unless the ISPs 
                                                          
28.  Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment Interests, 
Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking Sites, 8 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 176, 184 (2009). 
 
29.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) (defining the republisher’s scope of 
liability attached to the defamation cause of action). 
 
30.  See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study 
of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 373, 487 (2010). 
 
31.  Id. 
 
32.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
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created the defamatory speech.33 
A. Anonymity and Freedom of Expression as It Relates to Section 230 
While Section 230 protects ISPs from lawsuits arising out of third-
party content, the third-party individuals themselves remain completely 
liable and subject to litigation.34  For example, if someone posts a 
defamatory statement about someone on an AOL message board, AOL is 
protected, but the person who created the defamatory statement is subject 
to liability.  Due to the anonymity offered by the Internet however, 
plaintiffs, more often than not, struggle to identify who authored the 
defamatory speech against them, which explains why they go after the ISP 
for retribution.35 
The Internet is an entity with “few checks and balances and no due 
process.”36  Establishing the credibility of a claim arising from Internet 
interactions is no easy feat.37  Studies have shown that the anonymity of the 
Internet encourages people to say things that they normally would not.38  
Such anonymity is arguably one of the leading causes of cyberbullying and 
Internet defamation.39  Perpetrators no longer need to come into physical 
contact with the people they set out to harm, nor do they need to see the 
actual effects of their actions upon the victim.40 
Since anonymity has traditionally been associated with the freedom of 
expression, courts require a rather high threshold to be met in order to 
                                                          
33.  See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (barring the 
plaintiff’s otherwise legitimate claim because the only available defendant held immunity under 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act). 
 
34.  Richards, supra note 28, at 197. 
 
35.  See id. 
 
36.  Jessica Bennett, The Dark Side of Web Fame, NEWSWEEK MAG. (Feb. 21, 2008, 7:00 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/dark-side-web-fame-93505 [http://perma.cc/ZT4T-JN88]. 
 
37.  Id. 
 
38.  Id. 
 
39.  See id. 
 
40.  See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-
Mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169 (2005) (collecting CDA cases where plaintiffs alleged 
injury due to defamatory third-party statements made online). 
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compel the ISP to disclose the initial author’s identifying information.41  In 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, the court set forth the following 
standard for courts to consider when a plaintiff requests to compel the 
disclosure of an anonymous wrongdoer: 
 
The court held that when a plaintiff makes a request of this kind, 
(1) the plaintiff must provide notice to the anonymous posters 
and provide them an opportunity to oppose the disclosure 
request; (2) the plaintiff must set out the statements that 
allegedly constitute defamatory speech; (3) the plaintiff must 
establish a prima facie case against the anonymous person(s); 
(4) the plaintiff must set forth evidence to support each element 
of the cause of action; and (5) the court must balance the 
anonymous defendant’s free speech rights against the strength of 
the plaintiff’s claim.42 
 
Even if the plaintiff is able to compel the ISP to disclose such 
information, it will be in the form of an IP address.43  Given that many 
people share IP addresses through common public networks or Wi-Fi 
hotspots, the likelihood that such information would be of any great value 
is slim.44 
B. Defamation at Common Law 
The most common cause of action involving immunity granted under 
the CDA is defamation.45  The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, “A 
communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another 
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons 
from associating or dealing with him.”46  Defamation laws are 
                                                          
41.  Richards, supra note 28, at 198–201. 
 
42.  Bryant Storm, Comment, The Man Behind the Mask: Defamed Without a Remedy, 33 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 393, 402–03 (2013) (citing Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)). 
 
43.  See Bennett, supra note 36. 
 
44.  Id. 
 
45. Ardia, supra note 30, at 394 & n.83 (discussing the findings of his empirical study, in 
which he found, “Defamation claims, including libel, slander, trade libel, and disparagement, 
occurred in 50.5% of the decisions”). 
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“implemented to strike a balance between the First Amendment speech 
rights of the speaker and the rights of the defamed to protect their 
reputation and to be compensated for injuries to it.”47  The traditional 
elements of defamation are: (1) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third-party; (3) 
fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) 
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm caused by the publication.48 
The last element, which relates to proof of harm, is usually the most 
difficult element for a plaintiff to establish.  It can be established by either 
proof of specific harm, i.e., harm that can be quantified and shown to be a 
direct cause of the statement (such as the loss of one’s job), or the 
statement may be defamatory on its face.49  A statement is defamatory on 
its face, “per se,” if the statement pertains to a matter that so negatively 
stigmatized by society that harm may be presumed.50  While facially 
defamatory statements may vary by jurisdiction, common law has generally 
recognized four categories of such statements: (1) criminal conduct; (2) 
loathsome diseases; (3) sexual misconduct; and (4) lack of professional 
competency.51 
Prior to the CDA, liability was not only placed upon the original 
defamer; any person that republished defamatory speech was subject to the 
same degree of culpability.52  Imagine that Magazine A falsely reported 
that Company B was involved in money laundering, and Newspaper C—
relying on Magazine A’s story—republished a subsequent article to the 
same effect.  In such a case, both A and C would be subject to liability.  
However, the scope of liability differs depending on how significant a role 
the defendant C played in making the defamatory statement.53 
                                                          
46.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).  
 
47.  See Storm, supra note 42, at 396. 
 
48.  Id. at 395. 
 
49.  See 128 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 3 (2013). 
 
50.  Id. § 4. 
 
51.  Id. 
 
52.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).  
 
53.  See Storm, supra note 42, at 396–98 (distinguishing the role of the original publisher, 
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At common law, there are three categories of involvement for which 
liability may extend.54  First, the publisher is the original speaker or author 
of the defamatory statement(s) and is subject to complete liability.55  The 
author of an article in a newspaper, for example, is considered the 
publisher.  Publication to a third-party could be the simple utterance of a 
defamatory statement to another, or the providing of access to the written 
defamatory speech for another to read.56  Second, the republisher is the 
entity that re-publishes the defamatory content, and it is treated as if it were 
the original author of the statement in question, such as a newspaper.57  
Third, the distributor disseminates the defamatory material through 
something like a bookstore or a newsstand, and it is held liable only if it 
has reason to know of the defamatory content.58 
Stratton v. Prodigy is an early Internet defamation case that is said to 
have largely contributed to the creation of Section 230 of the CDA.59  
There, Stratton filed suit against Prodigy, a computer network, for its 
publication of defamatory statements posted by a third-party on a message 
board on Prodigy’s website.60  The New York state court found that 
Prodigy’s liability should be analyzed under its role as a publisher, not as a 
distributor.61  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Prodigy staff 
regulated the speech on their message boards, screened for outright 
offensive material and edited such content, and thereby assumed a 
publishing role.62  Thus Prodigy’s liability was equivalent to that of the 
original author of the libelous speech.63  Stratton illustrates that prior to the 
                                                          
republisher, and/or distributor in an Internet defamation suit). 
 
54.  Id. 
 
55.  Id. at 396. 
 
56.  Id. 
 
57.  Id. at 396–97. 
 
58.  Id. at 397. 
 
59.  Storm, supra note 42, at 398. 
 
60.  Id. 
 
61.  Id. 
 
62.  See id. 
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enactment of the CDA, courts generally analyzed Internet defamation 
under the same guidelines that govern all libelous speech.64 
C. The Creation of the CDA 
The CDA was initially created to criminalize known users who post 
offensive or inappropriate content in a manner easily accessible to minors 
over the internet.65  The new law applied to material that is “in context, 
patently offensive, and depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or 
organs.”66  Although the CDA was originally created to address a very 
narrow issue, it appears the Act has had a consequential effect applicable to 
all Internet activities because of the way Section 230 has been interpreted 
by the courts.67 
Prior to looking closer at the CDA and Section 230, it is imperative to 
note some of the terminology utilized throughout the Act.  Subsection (f) 
defines the term “interactive computer service” as “any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access . . . to a computer server.”68  The term “information 
content provider” refers to “any person or entity that is responsible . . . for 
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.”69 
Section 230 further states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”70  It 
                                                          
63.  Id. 
 
64.  Id. 
 
65.  Jim Exon, Commentary, The Communications Decency Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 95, 
96 (1996). 
 
66.  Id. 
 
67.  See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406–09 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (discussing how courts have interpreted Section 230 as it applies to internet 
defamation); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327 (barring the plaintiff’s otherwise legitimate claim because 
the only available defendant held immunity under Section 230). 
  
68.  47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (2012). 
 
69.  Id. 
 
70.  Id. § 230(c). 
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continues to suggest that no interactive service provider shall be liable for 
any editorial actions it takes in good faith to restrict access to inappropriate 
material, such as screening submissions prior to publication.71  The CDA 
states that the policy justifications for such immunity is “to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools” and to 
“remove disincentives for . . . blocking and filtering technologies that 
empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material.”72 
Another objective of the creation of Section 230 was to promote the 
growth and development of the Internet.73  While legal scholars today 
believe that objective has been met since the CDA’s creation two decades 
ago, there is concern that the courts’ interpretations of Section 230 have 
overly extended the protections afforded under the section.74 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 230’S BROAD SCOPE OF IMMUNITY 
The Internet has become such an integral part of our society that it is 
difficult to imagine a time without it.  The idea of what would become the 
World Wide Web was proposed merely twenty-seven years ago in 1989.75  
The Internet’s first website launched on August 6, 1991.76  In 1996, at the 
time of the CDA’s creation, only an estimated seventy-seven million 
individuals were using the Internet.77  By the end of 2014, there were 
roughly three billion Internet users worldwide.78  The Internet was such a 
                                                          
71.  Id. 
 
72.  Id. § 230(b). 
 
73.  Id. 
 
74.  Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 Is 
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet Service 
Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 37 (2007); Storm, supra note 42, at 415–16. 
 
75.  Kim Lachance Shandrow, 10 Fascinating Facts about the World Wide Web on Its 
25th Birthday, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 12, 2014), www.entrepreneur.com/article/232149 
[http://perma.cc/RR24-653L]. 
 
76.  Id. 
 
77.  INTERNET LIVE STATS, www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ 
[http://perma.cc/6WRG-JFAZ]. 
 
78.  Id. 
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new concept in 1996 that one could infer that the CDA creators could not 
have possibly imagined the Internet as it exists today.79  As a result, courts 
have struggled to interpret the scope of Section 230 as it applies to Internet 
activities today.80  While the statute’s initial purpose was to protect 
anonymity in the hopes of fostering robust free speech, Section 230 has 
created a lawless land for individuals to freely commit wrongs that would 
otherwise have been actionable.81 
A. The Passive ISP Typical of Early Section 230 Cases 
In order to adequately highlight how the courts today have 
erroneously overextended the scope of Section 230, it is necessary to look 
at how it was first applied to cases near the time of the CDA’s creation.  
Earlier courts interpreting the protections afforded under Section 230 dealt 
primarily with passive ISPs that merely created a forum for third-party 
Internet speech not subject to editorial review.  In Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc., an anonymous user posted on one of America Online’s (“AOL”) 
message boards, offering for sale t-shirts with offensive slogans relating to 
the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and instructing interested 
buyers to call “Ken” at Zeran’s telephone number.82  Zeran received a 
myriad of calls from people outraged by the exploitation of such a 
                                                          
79.  Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 Is 
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Service 
Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 36 (2007) (“At the time Congress enacted § 230, the 
Internet was a relatively new, developing technology and was very limited in its content.  
Providing online encyclopedias, dictionaries, bulletin boards and chat rooms were some of the 
small number of functions the Internet performed at the time.  Indeed, at the time Congress 
enacted § 230 it is unlikely that it knew that within a few years almost every newspaper and print 
medium would have a website publishing the same material.”). 
 
80.  See id. at 10–18 (discussing post-CDA cases that have interpreted Section 230 
immunity very broadly). 
 
81.  See Zac Locke, Comment, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites 
That Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151, 153 (2008) (“The 
fact that torts and crimes such as defamation, predation, and child pornography happen in 
cyberspace instead of on a street corner does not shield speakers from liability for their actions.  
However, under the current federal framework, [interactive computer services] are shielded from 
liability for speech posted on their networks by third parties.  While a traditional newspaper 
would probably face liability if it printed a photograph depicting child pornography in any section 
of the paper, an internet service provider . . . would not be liable for allowing the same 
photograph to be posted by a third-party on a chat room it controlled.”).  
 
82.  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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devastating event; some even threatened his life.83  An Oklahoma radio 
station further aggravated the situation when it read the AOL posting on-air 
and urged listeners to call Zeran’s telephone number to voice their disgust 
with him.84 
Zeran sued AOL for defamatory speech initiated by a third-party, but 
the district court held, and the Fourth Circuit later affirmed, that the CDA 
provision barred Zeran’s claims.85  In support of the judgment, the Fourth 
Circuit interpreted Congress’s intent behind the immunity of Section 230: 
 
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern.  
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to 
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.  
The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the 
communications of others represented, for Congress, simply 
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech.  
Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature 
of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep 
government interference in the medium to a minimum.86 
 
The court continued its rationale by pointing out that notice-based 
liability, like that imposed upon a distributor under common law, was too 
high of a burden to place upon ISPs as well.87  “In light of the vast amount 
of speech communicated through interactive computer services, these 
notices could produce an impossible burden for service providers, who 
would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech 
or sustaining prohibitive liability.”88  The Zeran decision, in effect, 
eliminated both common law publisher and distributor liability with respect 
to ISPs and defamatory speech stemming from their third-party users.89 
                                                          
83.  Id. 
 
84.  Id. 
 
85.  Id. at 328. 
 
86.  Id. at 330. 
 
87.  Id. at 333. 
 
88.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  
 
89.  Jeweler, supra note 79, at 22. 
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Most scholars agree that Zeran illustrates the proper context in which 
Section 230 should apply.90  For an ISP that is “merely the medium through 
which millions of third-parties post messages,” it seems unreasonable to 
hold it responsible for those third-party communications when an ISP does 
not serve in any type of editorial capacity.91  To do so would place an 
excessive burden upon such passive ISPs92 and would likely result in the 
automatic removal of flagged postings, thus threatening the right to 
freedom of speech.93  However, where an ISP reserves editorial control 
over a third-party’s speech (such as deciding whether or not to publish the 
speech), the ISP is effectively assuming the same duties as a publisher 
under common law and should be held accountable as such.94  As courts 
continue to expand the scope of Section 230, ISPs will soon have an 
absolute and automatic immunity to any legal claims arising from the 
actions of their third-party users.95 
B. The Broadening Scope of Section 230 
As the Internet progressed in to a dominant medium of 
communication, almost every print medium began publishing the same 
material both in print and on the Internet.96  This is where the interpretation 
of Section 230 immunity gradually became less clear and more 
problematic.97  The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia applied Section 230 to defamatory content arising from an 
Internet article in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the outcome of which contributed 
                                                          
90.  Id. at 22–23. 
 
91.  Id. at 22. 
 
92.  Id. at 12. 
 
93.  See id. at 20–21 
 
94.  See id. at 20. 
 
95.  See Jeweler, supra note 79, at 37 (maintaining that, despite Congress’s intent to 
promote the Internet’s growth without government interference, courts have interpreted Section 
230 to afford “such broad immunity that people are left with little chance to recover if they are 
defamed through the Internet”). 
 
96.  Id. at 36. 
 
97.  See id. (finding it unlikely that Congress intended to immunize ISPs for performing 
the same functions as their print counterparts). 
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to the broadening scope of immunity under Section 230.98 
In Blumenthal, White House employees brought a defamation claim 
against the columnist of an electronically-published gossip column99 and 
the ISP that contracted for the column, America Online, Inc. (“AOL”).100  
The columnist reported, “New White House recruit Sidney Blumenthal has 
a spousal abuse past that has been effectively covered up.”101  This rumor 
was especially harmful to the White House since the column was published 
the day before Sidney Blumenthal began his new role as Assistant to the 
President under President Bill Clinton, who had recently signed into law 
the Violence Against Women Act.102  The Blumenthals filed suit and AOL 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that Section 230 granted it 
immunity from claims arising from its third-party content.103 
In response to AOL’s summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs 
asserted that AOL was not afforded Section 230 immunity because AOL 
contracted for the column, paid the columnist $36,000 per year, reserved 
editorial rights to the content, and regularly promoted the column.104  In 
addition, shortly after contracting with the columnist, AOL had issued a 
press release describing the new column as “gossip and rumor” material 
and urged potential subscribers to sign up with AOL so as to not miss 
out.105  The plaintiffs argued, “Why should AOL be permitted to tout 
someone as a gossip columnist or rumor monger who will make such 
rumors and gossip ‘instantly accessible’ to AOL subscribers, and then 
claim immunity when that person, as might be anticipated, defames 
another?”106 
The court agreed with plaintiffs’ argument but contended that such 
                                                          
98.  Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Jeweler, supra note 
79, at 36–37.  
 
99.  Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 46. 
 
100.  Id. 
 
101.  Id. 
 
102.  Id. 
 
103.  Id. at 50. 
 
104.  Id. at 51. 
 
105.  Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51. 
 
106.  Id. 
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agreement was irrelevant due to the statutory language of Section 230 and 
how previous courts had interpreted and enforced it.107  The court 
acknowledged that AOL was not a passive conduit (such as the ISP in 
Zeran), and even went so far as to admit that “it would seem only fair to 
hold AOL to the liability standards applied to a publisher.”108  
Nevertheless, because “Congress has made a different policy choice by 
providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an 
active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by 
others,” the court felt bound to find statutory immunity and grant summary 
judgment in favor of AOL.109 
Zeran and Blumenthal, though only a year apart, concern two very 
distinct types of ISPs.110  Zeran concerns the type of ISP in existence at the 
time of the CDA’s enactment, one that merely provided a forum for third-
parties to post messages freely.111  While not without its critics, most courts 
and scholars agreed that immunity for these ISPs under Section 230 was 
reasonable in that case.112  In contrast, Blumenthal involved the next 
generation of ISPs whose role in the creation of the statement resembled 
that of a traditional print medium, such as a newspaper.113  The Blumenthal 
court itself was uncomfortable extending Section 230 immunity to an ISP 
that not only performed traditional editorial duties, but actually sought out 
and publicized the particular columnist in the hope that the scandalous 
content would encourage individuals to subscribe to their service.114  One 
would expect that if courts were having difficulty justifying the application 
of such a broad immunity, they would evolve the law so as to better serve 
justice.115  Be that as it may, eighteen years have passed since Blumenthal 
                                                          
107.  Id. at 51–53. 
 
108.  Id. at 51. 
 
109.  Id. at 52–53. 
 
110.  See Jeweler, supra note 79, at 22–24.  
 
111.  See id. at 22.  
 
112.  Id.  
 
113.  See id. at 23. 
 
114.  Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51–53. 
 
115.  See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1025 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J., 
dissenting) (commenting on the erroneous applications of Section 230 and how courts’ 
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and instead of limiting the scope of Section 230’s immunity, courts have 
actually expanded the scope even broader.116 
C. Section 230 Today: Analysis of 
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC 
The court in Blumenthal recognized that the Internet, although 
revolutionary and highly beneficial to society, has presented unprecedented 
challenges for which the “legal rules that will govern this new medium” 
had yet to be developed.117  However, as case law suggests, subsequent 
courts have adopted the Blumenthal philosophy in maintaining the status 
quo and have left the “shaping” of Internet law to their successors.118  The 
district court in Jones broke away from this philosophy and developed a 
legal standard that properly limited the scope of Section 230 to only apply 
to the passive ISPs that existed at the time of the CDA’s enactment.119  The 
district court therefore found distinct those ISPs of a more pervasive nature 
that have enjoyed the benefits of Section 230 for far too long.120  However, 
the appellate court was quick to return the ISP absolute immunity back to 
its expanding state.121 
As of the writing of this Note, it has been twenty-seven years since 
the conception of the Internet.122  Today’s courts are now dealing with a 
                                                          
interpretation of ISP absolute immunity is “absurd”). 
 
116.  See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
 
117.  Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49.  
 
118.  See generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An 
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010) (providing an empirical study of Section 230 case law and 
examining the 184 Section 230 cases that have taken place since the CDA’s creation).  As case 
law developed, courts have continued to interpret Section 230 immunity as all encompassing, yet 
a notable few mention the need to reevaluate the scope of immunity because of dramatically 
different circumstances surrounding the Internet and the role of ISPs today, as compared to those 
present at the time of the CDA’s creation.  Id. 
 
119.  See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010–11 
(E.D. Ky. 2012). 
 
120.  See id. 
 
121.  See Jones, 755 F.3d at 417 (vacating the district court’s judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and ordering the judgment be entered in favor of defendant). 
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new generation of ISPs increasingly involved in the creation of allegedly 
defamatory statements.123  The 2014 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Jones overturned the district court’s decision and instead found 
that an ISP still retains its privileged immunity under Section 230,124 even 
where it (1) provides a forum dedicated entirely to unconfirmed gossip 
submitted by third-parties;125 (2) screens each and every submission and 
selects only those most scandalous in nature to post;126 (3) claims the 
defamatory statement as its own by subsequently publishing those selected 
submissions under a single, universal anonymous author (“THE DIRTY 
ARMY”);127 and (4) adds its own commentary to the post.128  This decision 
has virtually bestowed upon ISPs a near absolute immunity.129  The only 
way an ISP could be any more involved in the creation of alleged 
defamatory speech would be if the ISP itself was the sole creator of the 
gossip.130 
                                                          
122.  Shandrow, supra note 75. 
 
123.  See, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d 398. 
 
124.  See id. at 409–17 (discussing the rationale behind preserving immunity for the ISP 
and ruling in favor of defendant). 
 
125.  See id. at 401–02 (“In short, the website is a user-generated tabloid primarily 
targeting non-public figures. . . . The vast majority of the content appearing on 
www.TheDirty.com is comprised of submissions uploaded directly by third-party users.”); see 
also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1271 (11th ed. 2004) (defining “tabloid” 
as “of, relating to, or resembling tabloids; especially: featuring stories of violence, crime, or 
scandal presented in a sensational manner”). 
 
126.  See Jones, 755 F.3d at 403 (“The site receives thousands of new submissions each 
day.  Richie or his staff selects and edits approximately 150 to 200 submissions for publication 
each day.”).  Taking the data provided in Jones (that, of the thousands of daily submissions only a 
small number get published) together with the observations of published submissions on the 
website, one can infer that those published are of a perverse or scandalous nature. 
 
127.  Id. (“Submissions appear on the website as though they were authored by a single, 
anonymous author— ‘THE DIRTY ARMY.’  This eponymous introduction is automatically 
added to every post that Richie receives from a third-party user.”). 
 
128.  Id. (“Richie typically adds a short, one-line comment about the post with ‘some sort 
of humorous or satirical observation.’”). 
 
129.  See id. at 409–11 (elaborating on the term “development” as it is read in Section 
230). 
 
130.  See id. 
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1. The District Court Properly Found TheDirty.Com’s Involvement Too 
Egregious to be Privileged to Section 230 Immunity 
The district court correctly found that the ISP in Jones concerned 
exactly the type of ISP that should not be privileged to the immunity of 
Section 230.131  As stated in Part I, Sarah Jones was the subject of several 
anonymous posts on www.TheDirty.com.132  “The website enables users to 
anonymously upload comments, photographs, and video, which Richie [the 
website creator and operator] then selects and publishes along with his own 
distinct, editorial comments.”133  The posts that get selected for publication 
are of the scandalous variety typical of a tabloid.134 
Despite Jones’s many pleas for removal, the defamatory posts 
remained online and actually received even more attention from Richie, as 
well as the media.135  Jones filed suit against the website for defamation, 
libel per se, false light publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.136  Although the defendants admitted that “facially defamatory and 
privacy-violating posts were made to their website concerning the 
plaintiff,” they also asserted that such claims were barred by Section 230.137 
The district court rejected defendants’ arguments, stating that Section 
230 immunity “applies only if the interactive computer service provider is 
not also an ‘information content provider,’ which is defined as someone 
who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of’ 
the offending content.”138  At that time, the Sixth Circuit had yet to decide 
                                                          
 131. See Jones, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (“This Court holds by reason of the very name of 
the site, the manner in which it is managed, and the personal comments of defendant Richie, the 
defendants have specifically encouraged development of what is offensive about the content of 
the site.”). 
 
132.  Jones, 755 F.3d at 401. 
 
133.  Id. 
 
134.  See id. 
 
135.  Id. at 404. 
 
136.  Id. at 401–02. 
 
137.  Jones, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1009–10. 
 
138.  Id. at 1010 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012); Fair Hous. Council v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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what actions by a website operator would constitute “creation or 
development of the offending content.”139  For guidance, the court looked 
to the rationale of Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC 
(“Roommates”).140  In Roommates, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant 
was not entitled to Section 230 immunity because the “defendant required 
subscribers to the site as prospective landlords or tenants to include 
information that was illegal under the Fair Housing Act.”141  The 
Roommates court held that by imposing that requirement, the website 
becomes “much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by 
others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that information.”142  
The district court in Jones continued its analysis by referencing FTC v. 
Accusearch, Inc. (“Accusearch”), in which a website operator sold the 
personal data of its users and the Tenth Circuit enunciated the controlling 
test for determining the applicability of Section 230 immunity: “We 
therefore conclude that a service provider is ‘responsible’ for the 
development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically 
encourages the development of what is offensive about the content.”143  
Under the guiding principles of Roommates and Accusearch, then, the 
Jones district court held that the defendant website does in fact 
“specifically encourage development of what is offensive about the 
content” in controversy.144 
2. The Appellate Court Reversed Any Progress Made in 
Section 230 Case Law 
The district court’s decision in Jones had the potential to develop 
Section 230 case law from a “one size fits all” bestowal of immunity 
towards a narrower, modern application of a twenty-year old statute.  The 
court progressed the case law by holding that a “website owner who 
intentionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party postings to which 
                                                          
139.  Jones, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1010. 
 
140.  Id. 
 
141.  Id. (discussing Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d 1157). 
 
142.  Id. 
 
143.  Jones, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1010–11 (citing FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1199 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
 
144.  Id. at 1012. 
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he adds his own comments ratifying or adopting the posts becomes a 
‘creator’ or ‘developer’ of that content and is not entitled to immunity.”145  
Unfortunately, the district court’s approach of differentiating between 
passive and active ISPs was rejected on appeal at one fell swoop.146  The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal, like many before it, acknowledged the 
behavior of the ISP was “regrettable” yet upheld the consensus among 
circuits that ISPs do not void their protection under Section 230 unless they 
themselves were the creators of what makes the content illegal.147 
The appellate court justified its interpretation of Section 230 
immunity with respect to the ISP in Jones by quoting Roommates: 
 
A website operator who edits user-created content—such as by 
correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for 
length—retains his immunity for any illegality in the user-
created content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the 
illegality.  However, a website operator who edits in a manner 
that contributes to the alleged illegality—such as by removing 
the word “not” from a user’s message reading “[Name] did not 
steal the artwork” in order to transform an innocent message into 
a libelous one—is directly involved in the alleged illegality and 
thus not immune.148 
 
The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s “encouragement test” 
stating that such a test would “inflate the meaning of ‘development’ to the 
point of eclipsing the immunity from publisher-liability that Congress 
established.”149  The court held that the lower court relied on Roommates 
yet omitted the “crucial distinction” between ISPs taking actions “that are 
necessary to the display of unwelcome and actionable content” and those 
actually responsible for the creation of the illegality or actionable aspect of 
                                                          
145.  Jones, 755 F.3d at 413 (citing Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 965 F. 
Supp. 2d 818, 821 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (supplemental memorandum opinion)). 
 
146.  See id. at 414. 
 
147.  See generally Bill Donahue, 6th Circ. Gossip Site Ruling a Relief for Web Hosts, 
LAW360 (June 17, 2014, 8:52  PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/548946/6th-circ-gossip-site-
ruling-a-relief-for-web-hosts (discussing the Sixth Circuit Jones opinion). 
 
148.  Jones, 755 F.3d at 411 (citing Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1169). 
 
149.  Id. at 414. 
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the content.150  To highlight this misrepresentation, the court pointed out 
that in Roommates, the website operator was found responsible for the 
illegal content because he required users to submit protected characteristics 
and hid listings based on those submissions.151  Here lies the fault within 
the appellate court’s logic.  The appellate court failed to sufficiently 
distinguish the actions of the ISP in Roommates from those of the ISP in 
Jones.152 
In Roommates, the ISP essentially required its users to participate in 
housing discrimination by forcing those wishing to post on its website to 
include protected characteristics such as race, gender, or age to be used as 
search criteria for future roommates.153  This barred immunity under 
Section 230.154  Likewise, in Jones, the ISP effectively required its users to 
create submissions of scandalous gossip if they wished for their 
submissions to be published.155  If thousands of submissions came through 
TheDirty.com daily, and of those only a few hundred got published,156 one 
might wonder what criteria was used in selecting those particular 
submissions.  As the Jones ISP admitted, selections certainly were not 
based on whether or not the allegations had been factually confirmed.157 
Observation of the website reasonably leads to the conclusion that  
the level of atrocity within the allegations is a criteria for publication.158  
                                                          
150.  Id. 
 
151.  Id. 
 
152.  Author’s opinion based on the appellate court’s finding that “[u]nlike in Roommates, 
the website that Richie operated did not require users to post illegal or actionable content as a 
condition of use.”  Id. at 416. 
 
153.   Id. at 414. 
 
154.  Jones, 755 F.3d at 414. 
 
155.  See id. at 403. 
 
156.  Id. 
 
157.  Id. (stating Richie does not “fact-check submissions for accuracy”). 
 
158.  Author’s opinion based on observation of recent submissions published on the 
TheDirty.com, all of which involved unconfirmed allegations that have the ability to destroy 
reputations.  The footnotes following are postings taken directly from the site’s Los Angeles 
County listing, accessed on November 8, 2014.  The postings referred to in this Note are not 
curated to illustrate only the most egregious found on the site, but are simply a sample taken 
directly from the most recent postings that day.  Los Angeles Gossip, THE DIRTY (Nov. 8, 2014), 
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For example, recent postings in the Los Angeles section of TheDirty.com 
included the following allegations against named individuals: (1) 
insinuating a woman was an escort or prostitute because she wore 
expensive eyeglasses,159 (2) accusing a local sober living facility of false 
advertising, sexual exploitation and slander against its clients, tampering 
with U.S. Mail, public disclosure of private facts, procurement of 
prostitution, and allowing on-going drug use within the sober living 
home,160 (3) accusing a woman of promiscuity, adultery, soliciting casual 
sex on the Internet, and contracting a sexually transmitted disease,161 and 
(4) accusing a woman of being a “money hungry butter-faced 
hermaphrodite.”162  Notably, these postings all share common criteria:  they 
each identify the accused by name, allege claims that have the potential to 
destroy reputations, and, in some cases, subject the accused to potential 
criminal investigation.  Additionally, all submissions are posted 
anonymously under the pseudonym “THE DIRTY ARMY,” which the ISP 
gives to all of the submissions it decides to publish.163 
Assuming that these sensationally scandalous postings were (at a 
minimum) lured by the ISP, how then, are the factual circumstances of 
Jones different from those of Roommates?  The ISP’s actions in Jones 
arguably caused far more direct, immediate, and irreparable harm than the 
harm caused by the ISP in Roommates.164  To partake in the ISP’s services 
in Roommates, users had to self-identify certain characteristics (e.g., sex, 
family status, sexual orientation), as well as declare preferences regarding 
potential roommates (e.g., “I will live with children” or “I will not live with 
                                                          
www.thedirty.com/category/los-angeles/ [http://perma.cc/4W6N-V6TK]. 
 
159.  The Dirty Army, Whats Her Secret, THE DIRTY (Nov. 4, 2014, 10:06 AM), 
http://www.thedirty.com/gossip/toronto/whats-her-secret/ [http://perma.cc/3RSA-S82F]. 
 




161.  The Dirty Army, Susan Hien, THE DIRTY (Oct. 30, 2014, 6:39 AM), 
http://www.thedirty.com/gossip/los-angeles/susan-hien/ [http://perma.cc/5RAD-427H]. 
 
162.  The Dirty Army, Beware of Mankofit, THE DIRTY (Oct. 29, 2014, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.thedirty.com/gossip/hollywood/beware-of-mankofit/ [http://perma.cc/2GBC-J5Q2]. 
 
163.  See sources cited supra notes 159–62. 
 
164.  Compare Jones, 755 F.3d 398 (requiring unlawful defamatory speech), with Fair 
Hous. Council, 521 F.3d 1157 (requiring unlawful discriminatory speech). 
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children”)—all of which are protected characteristics under the Fair 
Housing Act.165  At a maximum, the resulting harm would be an individual 
finding less housing options due to his or her sex, family status, or sexual 
orientation being in conflict with the preferences stated by other users 
seeking a roommate.166  Despite receiving less housing options, the 
individual would not be aware of any discrimination against him or her 
because his or her search results would show just those housing listings for 
which the preferences of both parties matched.167  Surely, the ISP does not 
force any individual to cohabitate nor does it force cohabitation with a 
particular person.168  It is not illegal to have preferences for who you share 
a space with, only to publicize those preferences as means of housing 
discrimination.169  Make no mistake, the Roommates court properly found 
the ISP “responsible, at least in part, for developing that [unlawful] 
information.”170  Yet the ISP provided a search service, albeit based on 
discriminatory criteria, designed for mere efficiency and agreeable housing; 
the resulting harm, if any, would be a lack of compatible housing results.171 
The ISP’s conduct in Jones, on the other hand, contributed to a great 
deal of harm.172  In order for a user to have his or her submissions 
published, the submissions had to be publish-worthy—in other words, the 
user needed to submit gossip that would shock and appall readers.173  As 
                                                          
165.  Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1165–66. 
 
166.  See id. at 1165. 
 
167.  See id. at 1167. 
 
168.  See id. at 1166. 
 
169.  See id. at 1165–67. 
 
170.  See id. at 1166. 
 
171.  See Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1165 (“This information is obviously included 
to help subscribers decide which housing opportunities to pursue and which to bypass.  In 
addition, Roommate itself uses this information to channel subscribers away from listings where 
the individual offering housing has expressed preferences that aren’t compatible with the 
subscriber’s answers.”). 
 
172.  See Jones, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (“The defendants admit that facially defamatory 
and privacy-violating posts were made to their website concerning the plaintiff Sarah Jones.”). 
 
173.  See id. at 1012 (finding, among other things, that “the name of the site in and of 
itself encourages the posting only of ‘dirt,’ that is material which is potentially defamatory or an 
invasion of the subject’s privacy”); see also supra text accompanying notes 155–63. 
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this Note has illustrated, the Jones ISP postings inquire into the most 
intimate details of one’s private life, including accusations over finances, 
sexual health, and substance abuse and relapse.  False accusations related to 
such private matters would directly, immediately, and irreparably harm 
one’s reputation.  Since TheDirty.com does not require the gossip to be 
confirmed, nor does it conduct its own factual investigation, every post 
published by the ISP is subject to defamation claims.174  However, since the 
TheDirty.com publishes every submission under the same anonymous 
pseudonym, the victims of these defamatory allegations are left with no 
viable remedy for the harm done upon them, no matter how severe the 
damage.  Comparable to the ISP in Roommates that required its users to 
partake in illegal or actionable conduct as part of its service, the ISP in 
Jones extracted illegal defamatory information from its users as a condition 
of being published.  Yet unlike the ISP in Roommates that was correctly 
denied Section 230 protection, the Jones court allowed the defendant ISP to 
cloak itself in the statute’s overextended immunity.175 
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Although the initial policy justifications surrounding Section 230 
immunity serve a particular important purpose, courts today have grossly 
overextended its applicability.  Should Facebook per se be held accountable 
for all cyberbullying that takes place on their website?  No.  Generally, 
Facebook acts as a silent facilitator for social networking that does not edit 
postings, nor encourage or solicit any particular type of speech.176  
                                                          
174.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (outlining the elements 
supporting a defamation cause of action, including the publication of false statements due to at 
least negligence on the part of the publisher). 
 
175.  See Jones, 755 F.3d at 417. 
 
176.  Compare Daniel R. Anderson, Note, Restricting Social Graces: The Implications of 
Social Media for Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 881, 889 
(describing Facebook’s content-sorting algorithms), and Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 275–79 (critiquing Facebook’s content-censoring algorithms), with 
Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. CV 10-01360 SVW (PJWx), 2011 WL 2469822, 
at *19 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“Increasing the visibility of a statement is not tantamount to altering its 
message.”).  But see Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 802–03 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(denying Section 230 immunity because grouping users’ content in a particular way with third-
party logos transformed the speech into a commercial endorsement, such that Facebook’s actions 
went beyond a publisher’s traditional editorial functions); Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in 
an Online World: Holding the Web Host Liable for Cyberbullying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 277 (arguing that webhosts such as Facebook are in the best position to prevent 
cyberbullying). 
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Furthermore, Facebook allows images and posts to be flagged for removal 
if they are offensive or inappropriate.  In contrast, a website (1) designed 
for the sole purpose of destroying the reputations of another, (2) that 
screens each and every submission, (3) with the aim of publishing only the 
most demonizing postings, should not be afforded the same protections as 
passive service providers.177 
In general, online defamatory statements should revert back to the 
standards of common law.178  Section 230 should be amended so as to 
explicitly distinguish between passive ISPs and those soliciting depraved 
behavior.179  An ISP that serves in a traditional editorial capacity, 
resembling that of a newspaper, should be subject to the same liability as a 
publisher at common law.180  Section 230 immunity should only extend to 
those ISPs that make no editorial publication decisions and either: (1) 
require its third-party users register with valid identifying information such 
as a driver’s license number or (2) protect the anonymity of its users but 
offer a good-faith review system for content that has been flagged as 
offensive or damaging so that it may respond in an appropriate manner.  
Therefore, an ISP who provides a forum for anonymous publication but 
reserves no editorial control over publication would be subject to liability 
similar to that of a distributor at common law.181  That is to say, such an 
ISP would only be liable for illegal or actionable content that had been 
flagged for removal as offensive or damaging but had remained accessible 
to the public or otherwise was not removed within a reasonable time.182 
If the aforementioned proposed legal standard had been applied to 
Jones, the court would have reached a much more just result.  Since the ISP 
in Jones screened every third-party user’s posting and decided which ones 
to publish, the ISP acted in an editorial capacity (just as a newspaper), and 
                                                          
 
177.  See Jessica Bennett, The Dark Side of Web Fame, NEWSWEEK MAG. (Feb. 21, 2008, 
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/dark-side-web-fame-93505 [http://perma.cc/ZT4T-JN88]. 
 
178.  See Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 
230 Is Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet 
Service Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 21–31 (2007).  
 
179.  See id. at 22.  
 
180.  Id. at 32. 
 
181.  Id. at 30. 
 
182.  See id. at 32–34. 
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it therefore would have lost its privilege to Section 230 immunity.  Thus, 
just as in common law, a defamed individual would have the option of 
filing suit against the third-party user who created the material and/or the 
ISP for deciding to publish the alleged defamatory statement.  If the ISP in 
Jones wished to retain its Section 230 immunity in the future, it would need 
to relinquish its editorial rights and allow its users to post freely.  In 
addition, the ISP would also need to require its users to register with the 
site using a valid name and address, driver’s license number, or some other 
official form of identification.  If the ISP wished to continue to protect its 
users’ anonymity, it could do so while also establishing a system of good 
faith review, where an individual could flag a post as being offensive or 
defamatory and the ISP could then remove any posts found to be actionable 
at law. 
This proposal not only offers the same freedom of speech protection 
the creators of the CDA set out to uphold, but it also offers additional 
benefits to society.183  Setting explicit guidelines and parameters regarding 
ISP liability will actually further promote free speech.184  ISPs will have a 
better understanding of what their legal obligations are and thus will be less 
likely to be overly conservative in their editorial practices.185  Additionally, 
ISPs could still assume zero liability so long as they require adequate 
identification from their third-party posters.  Holding the initial authors 
accountable will deter users from partaking in criminal or actionable 
behavior.  Freedom of speech protects an individual’s right to voice his or 
her concerns or opinions; it does not, however, allow for the destruction of 
another’s reputation by way of false accusations.186  Finally, this proposal 
allows victims of Internet defamation to have a fighting chance at 
recovering for the harm done to them just as they would if the defamatory 
statements were published in a print medium. 
 
                                                          
183.  See id. at 33.  
 
184.  See Jeweler, supra note 178, at 29 (“Potential defamation liability may actually 
promote speech on the Internet because the fear of being verbally attacked without the 
opportunity for redress is a disincentive for people to speak their minds on the Internet.”). 
 
185.  See id. at 27–28 (maintaining that ISPs are incentivized not to implement overly-
aggressive content screening because doing so would cause the “Internet marketplace” to view 
the business in a negative light). 
 
186.  See id. at 28 (emphasizing that the First Amendment does not allow all speech to go 
unregulated). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 
the Internet was very limited in its content and in the kinds of functions it 
provided, which primarily consisted of encyclopedias, dictionaries, and 
chat rooms.187  With the Internet being a relatively new, developing 
technology at that time, it is incredibly unlikely Congress could have 
predicted the dominance and capabilities of the Internet today.188  The 
Internet and digital media have become such a staple in modern everyday 
life that it is said to be quickly making physical print products obsolete.189  
Books are now commonly offered in digital form and some newspapers and 
magazine entities have decided to offer their content solely online.190  
Holding Internet speech to a different standard than that governing print 
speech is an antiquated distinction.191  The current state of Internet 
defamation law makes it possible for newspapers and other print mediums, 
although exposed to liability for publishing slanderous content in print, to 
evade all legal recourse against them by simply using their Internet 
counterpart to publish the defamatory material under an anonymous 
author.192 
Higher courts are wary to limit or eliminate Section 230 civil 
immunity out of fear that to do so would “impose the full social costs of 
harm from third-party postings on intermediaries” and as a result, 
intermediaries “will respond by inefficiently restricting the uses that third 
parties can make on the Internet.”193  The resulting overextended immunity 
                                                          
187.  Matthew G. Jeweler, Note, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 Is 
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet Service 
Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 36 (2007). 
 
188.  Id. 
 




190.  Id.  
 
191.  See Jeweler, supra note 187, at 31 (“The Internet allows for cheap, fast and far-
reaching dissemination of defamatory material . . . .”). 
 
192.  Id. at 18–19. 
 
193.  Mark A. Lemley, Digital Rights Management: Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 
6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 112 (2007); see also Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, 
The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 274 (2005) (“[A] 
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has left victims of Internet defamation or privacy violations with little to no 
opportunity to litigate their claims unless the original author can actually be 
identified.194  By reverting back to common law standards as applied to 
defamatory speech in the context of ISPs, speech on the Internet would be 
given the opportunity to flourish.195  The protection of defamation causes of 
action at common law has not come at the expense of the First 
Amendment; Internet defamation should be no different. 
Someone who makes a defamatory statement regarding another in the 
“real” world is subject to liability, as is the source that published or 
disseminated it.196  It logically follows then, that liability should also attach 
where an individual anonymously posts the very same defamatory 
statement on the Internet (where the exposure is far greater and more 
damaging) through an ISP playing an editorial role.  A statute dating back 
twenty years can no longer be used to cast a near-limitless net of protection 
in a medium that has drastically evolved since the statute’s inception, with 
no signs of slowing.  Society is harmed when the very laws that govern it 
are outdated in purpose and application.  It is time to amend Section 230 so 
that once again, First Amendment protections are balanced with the rights 
of the defamed to protect their reputations and their livelihood. 
 
                                                          
risk always exists that imposing additional burdens on intermediaries will chill the provision of 
valuable goods and services.  That will be especially problematic in cases where considerable risk 
of chilling legal conduct that is adjacent to the targeted conduct exists.”). 
 
194.  Bryant Storm, Comment, The Man Behind the Mask: Defamed Without A Remedy, 
33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 393, 401 (2013). 
 
195.  See Jeweler, supra note 187, at 29. 
 
196.  See id. at 4. 
 
